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Releasing the Fantasy: Wittgenstein’s Critique of Consciousness 
Killian Beck 
Introduction 
My work defends Wittgenstein’s continued relevance to philosophy of mind by 
presenting a close exegesis of §420 of the Philosophical Investigations, a remark in which he 
anticipates contemporary debates concerning the conceivability of so-called “zombies”, or 
imaginary creatures who lack consciousness, but are otherwise identical to human beings. In §1, 
I survey some of the major historical developments that led to the emergence of the idea of 
zombies in the mid-1970’s, before discussing David Chalmers’ use of the idea in a modal 
argument against physicalism. In §2, I turn to the work of one of Chalmers’ most prominent 
opponents, Daniel Dennett, whose rejection of the conceivability of zombies is informed by the 
scientifically-minded approach to consciousness that he advocates. Despite avowing his 
influence, I argue in §§3 and 4 that Dennett’s externalist approach to consciousness diverges 
sharply from that taken by Wittgenstein.  
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1. 
In his paper, “Wittgenstein, Wittgensteinianism, and the Contemporary Philosophy of 
Mind – Continuities and Changes”, Ansgar Beckermann accounts for the emergence of what he 
refers to as a “new, post-Wittgensteinian orthodoxy” in contemporary philosophy of mind.1 
According to Beckermann, during the first few decades following the posthumous publication of 
the Philosophical Investigations, “Wittgenstein was the measure of all things in philosophy and 
especially in the philosophy of mind.”2 The Wittgensteinian orthodoxy of the 1950’s and 60’s 
drew inspiration from the book’s private language discussion and Wittgenstein’s remarks on the 
use of psychological terms, more generally. As Beckermann explains:  
The predominant view in the 50s and 60s was a view that one could call the “criteriological 
account.” According to the proponents of this view Wittgenstein has shown by means of 
considerations on the meaning of linguistic expressions in general that there can be no mental 
states without behavioural criteria. Pain behaviour is not just a symptom of the mental state pain, 
but a criterion. That is to say, pain behaviour is corrigible evidence that somebody is in pain, but 
for semantic reasons it is, in a certain way, also sufficient evidence. For semantic reasons, it is 
true that if a person shows this behaviour and there is no evidence to the contrary, then this 
person is in pain.3  
One of the most important implications for this view was its apparent dissolution of the mind-
body problem. For on the “criteriological account” of mind, the distinction between the mental 
and the physical is not understood as a difference between the types of phenomena, to which, 
concepts of the former and the latter correspond, respectively. It is, rather, a failure to notice the 
 
1 Beckermann (2004), p. 287. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. 288. 
 3 
difference between our use of mental and physical concepts that creates the illusion of a 
substantial difference between mental and physical phenomena, respectively.  
 The Wittgensteinian orthodoxy in philosophy of mind began to wane after the causal 
character of mental explanation came under dispute in the late 1960’s.4 Broadly speaking, 
proponents of criteriological accounts of mind would deny that statements involving mental 
concepts are explained by underlying mental processes or events, but are accounted for in terms 
of patterns of behaviors, instead. This view came under pressure by causalists who believed that 
mental explanations do in fact exhibit a causal character and should therefore be analyzed as 
such. They believed that criteriological accounts had gone too far in denying that an agent’s 
cognitive states – her beliefs, desires, etc. –  are causally related to her behavior. In their view, 
for example, the concept, “pain” in the utterance, “She is holding her cheek because she is in 
pain”, is more naturally analyzed as an explanation for her pain behavior than as a reference to a 
certain pattern of behavior. By treating mental concepts as “theoretical concepts”, causalists 
believed they could preserve the causal character expressed by statements involving mental 
explanations, without taking those terms to refer to inner, private mental entities.5 
Beckermann thus identifies the dispute over the causal character of mental concepts at the 
end of the 1960’s and into the early 1970’s as an important turning point in Wittgenstein’s 
reception in philosophy of mind – a dispute in which the causalists, according to Beckermann, 
“clearly won the day.”6 Although Beckermann welcomes the new, post-Wittgensteinian 
orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind, he does regret one of its consequences: the revival of the 
mind-body problem. 
 
4 Ibid., p. 305. 
5 Ibid., p. 301.  
6 Ibid., p. 305. 
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[I]n the mid-70s something began to happen within the framework of the new orthodoxy which 
could well be regarded as a return to Cartesianism. The starting point was Thomas Nagel’s 
seminal paper “What is it like to be a bat?”. The considerations of Nagel, Jackson, Levine, 
Chalmers
 
and many others all seem to point to the same result, namely, that at least phenomenal 
states have characteristic features that in the last consequence are not public, since they are 
neither tied to typical behaviours nor to causal roles. The idea of the philosophical zombie was 
born – the idea of a being that in all situations says exactly the same as I say, and does exactly the 
same as I do, but whose phenomenal states are – on this assumption – either connected with 
radically different qualia or with none at all. 7   
Among those figures Beckermann lists, David Chalmers has made especially far-reaching use of 
philosophical zombies. His “zombie argument”, as I’ll henceforth refer to it, is a modal argument 
against materialism. It depends, foremost, on a distinction he draws between two concepts of 
mind, which he terms the “psychological” and “phenomenal” concepts of mind, respectively.8 
Chalmers describes the former as “the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for 
behavior. A mental state is conscious in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in the 
production of behavior…”9 On the latter concept, “mind is characterized by the way it feels”10, 
i.e. in terms of the “something it is like”11, or qualia of experience. Thus, a zombie, for 
Chalmers, is a creature for whom the “phenomenal” concept of mind necessarily could not 
apply:  
What is going on in my zombie twin? He is physically identical to me, and we may as well 
suppose that he is embedded in an identical environment. He will certainly be identical to me 
 
7 Ibid., p. 305.  
8 Chalmers (1996), p. 10.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 3.  
 5 
functionally: he will be processing the same sort of information, reacting in a similar way to 
inputs, with his internal configurations being modified appropriately and with indistinguishable 
behavior resulting. He will be psychologically identical to me, in the sense developed in Chapter 
1. He will be perceiving the trees outside, in the functional sense, and tasting the chocolate, in the 
psychological sense. All of this follows logically from the fact that he is physically identical to 
me, by virtue of the functional analyses of psychological notions. He will even be “conscious” in 
the functional senses described earlier—he will be awake, able to report the contents of his 
internal states, able to focus attention in various places, and so on. It is just that none of this 
functioning will be accompanied by any real conscious experience. There will be no phenomenal 
feel. There is nothing it is like to be a zombie.12  
Chalmers takes the conceivability of zombies to be entirely unproblematic, and thus readily 
employs the idea in a modal argument against physicalism: 
(1.) It is conceivable that there be zombies. 
(2.) If it is conceivable that there be zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies.  
(3.) If it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies, then consciousness is nonphysical.  
(4.) Consciousness is nonphysical.13 
Chalmers contrasts “metaphysically possible” with “naturally possible”, and thus admits that 
zombies “probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature.”14 Nonetheless, if 
something is metaphysically possible, then it could have existed, or the universe could have been 
such that it existed. Thus, as Chalmers argues, “if there is a metaphysically possible universe that 
is physically identical to ours but that lacks consciousness, then consciousness must be a further, 
nonphysical component of our universe.”15 In other words, he believes that consciousness isn’t 
 
12 Ibid., pp. 84-5.  
13 Chalmers (2002), pp. 247-72. 
14 Ibid., p. 249. 
15 Ibid. 
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entailed by physical facts, alone, since the metaphysical possibility of zombies implies that the 
very same set of facts would be consistent with the non-existence of consciousness. Thus, 
Chalmers concludes, there exists an “explanatory gap between the physical level and conscious 
experiences.”16 What Chalmers refers to as the “hard problem” of consciousness, then, is 
precisely the problem of bridging that gap.17  
Although not entirely dismissive of those who deny the conceivability of zombies (or 
“Type-A materialists” as he refers to them), Chalmers does admit that the question of whether 
zombies are conceivable is ultimately a matter of intuition.18 Whether one shares Chalmer’s 
intuition concerning the conceivability of zombies will likely depend on whether one approves 
his distinction between the “psychological” and “phenomenal” concepts of mind, viz. that the 
latter characterizes mind in terms of the qualia that (to use the word Chalmers favors) 
“accompany” experience. More broadly, Chalmer’s intuition would likely appeal to those who 
believe that conscious experience has an ineradicably subjective character – a conviction one 
might express by insisting that one’s experience of the world is from a particular point of view, 
so to speak.19 In any case, Chalmers seems to take some comfort in his observation that “the 
intuition appears to be shared by the large majority of philosophers, scientists and others; and it 
is so strong that to deny it, a type-A materialists needs exceptionally powerful arguments. The 
result is that even among materialists, type-A materialists are a distinct minority.”20 
 
2. 
 
16 Chalmers (1996), p. 94. 
17 Chalmers (1995).   
18 Chalmers (1996), p. 85. See also: Chalmers (2002), p. 253.  
19 Cf. Nagel (1974). 
20 Chalmers (2002), p. 253. 
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One particularly loud voice in that minority is Daniel Dennett, whose criticism of the idea 
and its supporters often verges on the polemical:  
[W]hen philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task 
of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own 
definition. This conceals from them the fact that the philosophical concept of a zombie is sillier 
than they have noticed.21  
Central to Dennett’s hardline functionalist account of mind is his denial of the putative 
“explanatory gap” between the physical and the phenomenal, for he regards the latter category as 
entirely vacuous; there simply are no “remnants” of experience that would be left unexplained by 
a complete account of those phenomena that, say, Chalmers takes the “psychological” concept of 
mind to designate.22 In attempting to distinguish between the “psychological” and “phenomenal” 
concepts of mind, respectively, Chalmers commits what Dennett calls the “fallacy of 
subtraction”, which he illustrates accordingly: 
Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving 
all cognitive systems intact - a quite standard but entirely bogus feat of imagination - is like 
supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all 
bodily functions and powers intact. If you think you can imagine this, it's only because you are 
confusedly imagining some health-module that might or might not be present in a body. Health 
isn't that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness.23 
Dennett’s opposition to those who maintain the conceivability of zombies amounts to a denial 
that there could be anything that a zombie could be imagined to lack, if it’s assumed that 
zombies are functionally identical to humans. For Dennett, then, the question of whether zombies 
 
21 Dennett (1995), p. 322. 
22 Dennett (2002). 
23 Ibid., p. 325. 
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are conceivable has a straightforward answer: no. 
On Beckermann’s assessment of the new orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, “those who 
claim that philosophical zombies are possible have strayed a step too far from 
Wittgensteinianism.”24 It is, perhaps, a sign of Dennett’s Wittgensteinianism, then, that he 
represents an exception to the new orthodoxy in this regard. Indeed, Dennett considers 
Wittgenstein among the most formative of his philosophical influences and even characterizes 
his own work as “a kind of redoing of Wittgenstein’s attack on the objects of conscious 
experience.”25 According to Dennett’s own self-assessment, then, his work can be viewed as a 
proxy through which Wittgenstein’s legacy continues to shape the philosophy of mind.  
Against this, I argue that Dennett’s approach to questions about consciousness diverges 
from Wittgenstein’s in a number of fundamental respects, such that the overall character of the 
former’s views is, at most, only distantly “Wittgensteinian.” To this end, I begin by considering 
how Dennett conceives his relation to Wittgenstein before discussing his 
“heterophenomenological” approach to mind. I argue that Dennett’s misreading of the 
Investigations leads him to overestimate his proximity to Wittgenstein, the consequences of 
which are further exhibited by the decidedly un-Wittgensteinian character of his 
heterophenomenological method.  
On the status of qualia, for instance, Dennett regards Wittgenstein as an ally.26 Citing his 
“beetle in a box” story, Dennett claims that Wittgenstein, likewise, denied the existence of 
qualia, before specifying the finer differences in their views: 
I choose to take what may well be a more radical stand than Wittgenstein’s. Qualia are not even 
 
24 Beckermann (2004), p. 305.  
25 Dennett (1991), p. 22.  
26 Dennett (2002)., p. 230. 
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“something about which nothing can be said”; “qualia” is a philosopher’s term which fosters 
nothing but confusion, and refers in the end to no properties or features at all. 27 
Although it isn’t entirely clear from the above passage, Dennett apparently suggests that to 
regard qualia as “something about which nothing can be said” would render them ineffable – a 
stance that would thus fall short of what his own eliminative materialism prescribes, i.e., 
“deny[ing] resolutely the existence of something real or significant”28 – in this case, “qualia.”  
In any event, Dennett presents a distorted view of his relation to Wittgenstein by 
conceiving of it merely in terms of who between them took the “more radical stand”. On the 
contrary, far from supporting his assessment, the remark that Dennett cites from the 
Investigations suggests a rather more complicated situation. Quoted in full, §304 reads:  
304. “But you surely admit that there is a difference between pain behavior with pain and pain-
behavior without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? – “And yet you 
again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” – Not at all. It’s not a 
Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the 
same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the 
grammar which tends to force itself on us here. 
     The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always 
functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts – which may be about 
houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever.29  
By denying that “qualia” refers to any “properties or features at all”, Dennett apparently ignores 
Wittgenstein’s warning that, “a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about 
which nothing could be said.” From the perspective of §304, then, Dennett’s view is no better off 
 
27 Ibid. See also: Stern (2007). 
28 Ibid., p. 226. 
29 Wittgenstein (2009). Hereafter, all references to the Investigations will consist of in-line citations.  
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than that which it opposes. For by conceiving the problem as that of determining whether 
“qualia” refers to anything at all, Dennett presumes an oversimplified account of how our mental 
concepts work – viz., on the broadly referentialist “model of ‘object and name’” (§293). This 
presumption is hardly an isolated feature of Dennett’s project, but underwrites his entire 
approach to consciousness – a point that I hope to make clear shortly. 
Dennett advertises his heterophenomenological approach to consciousness as a third-
person, scientifically-minded replacement for the introspective methods of traditional 
phenomenology.30 Accordingly, Dennett rejects that a subject occupies an authoritative position 
with respect to her own consciousness. Instead, Dennett’s heterophenomenological approach 
involves an investigator who – in an anthropological fashion – considers a subject’s self-reports 
against the background of other relevant information about her and her immediate environment. 
The role of the investigator, Dennett explains: 
[…] is to compose a catalogue of what the subject believes to be true about his or her conscious 
experience. This catalogue of beliefs fleshes out the subject’s heterophenomenological world, the 
world according to S — the subjective world of one subject — not to be confused with the real 
world. The total set of details of heterophenomenology, plus all the data we can gather about 
concurrent events in the brains of subjects and in the surrounding environment, comprise the total 
data set for a theory of human consciousness. It leaves out no objective phenomena and no 
subjective phenomena of consciousness.31 
The investigator, moreover, is to adopt what Dennett calls an “intentional stance” towards the 
subject, which consists in remaining maximally neutral with regard to questions concerning the 
 
30 Dennett (2003), p. 19.  
31 Ibid., p. 20. 
 11 
content of the subject’s self-reports.32 Moreover, the intentional stance compels the investigator 
to remain neutral on the question of whether the subject of investigation is even conscious at all, 
presupposing only that the subject is an “intentional system, capable of meaningful 
communication.”33 The “primary”, or “raw, uninterpreted” data available to the investigator are 
the subject’s utterances.34  The investigator then interprets the subject’s utterances as “‘verbal 
judgements’ expressing her beliefs”, before, in the end, interpreting those judgements to involve 
the subject’s beliefs about her own (conscious) experience.35 
The heterophenomenological worlds generated by this process are not taken to 
correspond with, or describe, the subject’s conscious experience, itself, but merely the subject’s 
beliefs about her experiences, where such beliefs are understood to describe how the subject’s 
conscious experiences seem  to her, as opposed to how they really are.36 Dennett clarifies that 
such beliefs are to be treated “from the intentional stance as theorists’ fictions similar to centres 
of mass, the Equator, and parallelograms of force.”37 The upshot, as Dennett explains, is that, 
“Heterophenomenology is the beginning of a science of consciousness, not the end. It is the 
organization of the data, a catalogue of what must be explained, not itself an explanation or a 
theory.”38  
Although Dennett intends heterophenomenology as a maximally neutral data-gathering 
method, it’s accompanied by a peculiarly dogmatic outlook that admits neither the diversity of 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. p. 21. The feasibility of Dennett’s intentional stance is taken up by Cerbone (2019), which he 
contrasts with Wittgenstein’s notion of an “attitude towards a soul” (PPF §22). 
34 Ibid., p. 21. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., p. 20. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 28. 
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language nor indefiniteness of conscious experience. To start, the three-stage interpretative 
procedure by which a subject’s utterances are ultimately interpreted as truth-functional beliefs 
depends on the un-argued assumption that the variety of a subject’s speech acts – of which 
Dennett lists “reporting, questioning, correcting, requesting” – exhibit the same logical form.39 
That is, Dennett alternately refers to the interpretation of the subject’s utterances as “speech acts” 
or “judgements expressing those beliefs”, and thus implicitly takes the former to be analyzable as 
judgements with truth-functional contents. At least, he doesn’t take it to be a distinct 
interpretative move for the heterophenomological investigator to treat her subject’s utterances as 
speech acts or as judgements with truth-functional contents, and vice versa.  
In any case, even if it’s supposed that the heterophenomological investigator is concerned 
only with those of the subject’s utterances that can be analyzed as truth-functional judgements – 
her “reporting” speech acts, say – Dennett doesn’t account for the possibility of their successful 
identification, nor does he explain how such reports are supposed to be interpreted.40 Indeed, 
Dennett takes such matters of interpretation to be entirely unproblematic, and claims that the 
investigator’s “task of unifying the interpretation of all the verbal judgements into a 
heterophenomenological world is akin to reading a novel.”41  
Dennett’s analogy not only suggests his impatience for the sorts of considerations I’ve 
raised, but moreover reveals his commitment to the very conception of language from which 
Wittgenstein urged a “radical break” (§304), i.e., “the idea that language always functions in one 
way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts which may be about houses, pains, 
good and evil, or whatever” (§304). Accordingly, in taking the heterophenomenological subject’s 
 
39 Ibid., p. 20. 
40 A similar concern is raised by Hutto (1995).  
41 Dennett (2003), p. 22.  
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utterances to express truth-functional contents about her experience, Dennett considers only one 
of two alternatives. Either: 
(i.) the subject’s utterance expresses a true belief about her experience, in which case the 
subject’s description of her internal state is theoretically confirmable; or, 
(ii.) the belief expressed by the subject’s report about her experience is false, in which 
case the subject’s description of her internal state is not theoretically confirmable.  
Those of a subject’s reports that fail to yield theoretically confirmable descriptions are 
“demoted”, as it were, to talk of fictitious objects. Dennett thereby uses “fiction” to invoke an 
ontological contrast with reality – viz., to distinguish between that which correctly and 
incorrectly describes reality – a distinction that expedites his treatment of philosophical 
difficulties by, for example, allowing the easy disposal of such philosophically problematic ideas 
as “qualia” or “zombies.” 
As a term of philosophical criticism, then, the sense in which Dennett uses “fiction” is 
entirely distinct from that in which Wittgenstein uses it:  
307. “Aren’t you nevertheless a behaviorist in disguise? Aren’t you basically saying that 
everything except human behavior is a fiction?” – If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction (§307).  
A “grammatical fiction” isn’t, for Wittgenstein, a mistaken idea of the way a word functions – 
supported, as it were, by a metaphysical distinction between correct and incorrect uses of 
language, respectively – but rather, as Wittgenstein puts it, a mere “picture” that “stands in the 
way of our seeing the use of a word as it is” (§305). Wittgenstein’s goal isn’t to avoid the 
difficulties entailed by such pictures by claiming that they fail to accurately describe reality, but 
by targeting their sources in the inclinations that, while philosophizing, lead to our 
“bewitchment” by them (§109). In the next section, I elaborate on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s 
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philosophical outlook by considering his treatment of philosophical difficulties concerning 
consciousness in §§412-27 of the Investigations. I focus, in particular, on §420 – a remark in 
which Wittgenstein can be seen to anticipate contemporary debates concerning the conceivability 
of zombies.  
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3. 
In §420 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein considers a nearly identical question to that of 
whether zombies are conceivable:  
420. But can’t I imagine that people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though 
they behave in the same way as usual? – If I imagine it now – alone in my room – I see people 
with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business – the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. 
But just try to hang on to this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others – in the 
street, say! Say to yourself, for example: “The children over there are mere automata; all their 
liveliness is mere automatism.” And you will either find these words becoming quite empty; or 
you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.  
     Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting 
case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example. 
Before moving on, I want to clarify, briefly, the most obvious difference between the notions of 
a zombie and an automaton. While an automaton is taken to lack consciousness altogether, a 
zombie is more narrowly defined as lacking, merely, phenomenal consciousness. Recalling 
Chalmer’s use of the notion, a zombie is granted the full range of conscious experiences enjoyed 
by its conscious human counterparts, and is deprived only of the what-it’s-like or “qualia” of 
conscious experience. Although this difference might seem substantial, I believe it can be set 
aside without too much cost for the purposes of this essay. 
Unlike Dennett, who flatly denies the conceivability of zombies, one doesn’t find a 
similarly straightforward answer to the interlocutory voice’s question in §420. On the contrary, 
Wittgenstein’s narrator at first seems to concede that we could imagine that others were automata 
 16 
(at least in solitude) only to intimate that we could not (at least not without difficulty) hold onto 
such an idea amidst our ordinary intercourse with others.42  
However, that Wittgenstein’s narrator appears to equivocate depends on our presuming 
that the interlocutory voice’s question is itself intelligible. Doing so would not only foreclose the 
possibility of our appreciating the remark’s subtler argumentative structure, but would indicate a 
more general failure to acknowledge one of the defining characteristics of Wittgenstein’s outlook 
in the Investigations: 
374. The great difficulty here is not to present the matter as if there were something one couldn’t 
do. As if there really were an object, from which I extract a description, which I am not in a 
position to show anyone. — And the best that I can propose is that we yield to the temptation to 
use this picture, but then investigate what the application of the picture looks like. 
This outlook appears most prominently in the private language discussion of §§243ff., in which 
the following question (similar to that with which §420 begins) is addressed: “But is it 
conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his 
inner experiences – his feelings, moods, and so on – for his own use?” (§243), followed by the 
qualification that “The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know – to 
his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language” (§243). As 
the discussion that follows §243 indicates, Wittgenstein’s concern is not to show the 
 
42 My use of “interlocutory voice” and “Wittgenstein’s narrator” to distinguish the dialogic participants of 
§420 is a device I’ve borrowed from Stern (2004), whose approach to the Investigations emphasizes its 
“profoundly dialogical character” (p. 37). In addition to these voices, he identifies a third voice which 
“provides an ironic commentary” on the exchanges between the other two, consisting “partly of 
objections to assumptions the debaters take for granted, and partly of platitudes about language and 
everyday life they have both overlooked” (p. 22). Although he takes the commentator to come closest to 
expressing the author’s views, Stern ultimately warns against identifying any of these voices with that of 
that author’s. On this aspect of the text’s style and its methodological role, see Stern (2017). See also 
Cavell (1962), which Stern credits as the first reading of the Investigations to recognize its multiplicity of 
voices. 
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impossibility of such a (private) language, but rather, as David Stern argues, to lead us to see that 
the “very idea of a private language is illusory, and falls apart upon closer examination.”43 
 In a similar vein, Cavell denies that the upshot of Wittgenstein’s private language 
discussion concerns a “failure of imagination” or the “non-existence of a private language”, but 
rather that “there is nothing of the sort to imagine, or rather that when we as it were try to 
imagine this we are imagining something other than we think.”44 Cavell echoes the language 
Wittgenstein employs in §374 – that of yielding to temptation – in the way he characterizes the 
“tone” of the question raised in §243 as that of “someone allowing a fantasy to be voiced”, such 
that Wittgenstein seeks not the denial of this fantasy, but its release.45  
 I believe that §420 is occupied by a similar concern, i.e., that of releasing the fantasy 
expressed in the interlocutory voice’s question, “But can’t I imagine that other people are 
automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual?” My goal is to 
show that careful attention to the remarks that precede §420 should make us suspicious of the 
interlocutory voice’s question, i.e., that it should hardly come as a surprise that the interlocutory 
voice’s question is not intelligible, nor treated as such, given the set-up in §§412-19.  
That the interlocutory voice’s question in §420 begins with the subordinating 
conjunction, “But”, suggests that it takes the form of a response to, or continuation of, a broader 
discussion. Indeed, §§412-27 constitute an extended discussion on the topic of consciousness, a 
discussion precipitated by the question with which §412 opens: “The feeling of an unbridgeable 
gulf between consciousness and brain processes: how come that this plays no role in reflections 
of ordinary life?” This question contains, in germ, Chalmer’s “hard problem” of consciousness 
 
43 Stern (2011). 
44 Cavell (1979), p. 344.  
45 Ibid. 
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which I discussed in Section 1, i.e., that of accounting for the putative explanatory gap between 
the physical and the phenomenal. Rather than seeking an account of consciousness that bridges 
that gap, however, Wittgenstein shifts the focus onto the ways in which we create the illusion of 
one: 
The idea of a difference in kind is accompanied by slight giddiness – which occurs when we are 
doing logical tricks. (The same giddiness attacks us when dealing with certain theorems in set 
theory.) When does this feeling occur in the present case? It is when I, for example, turn my 
attention in a particular way on to my own consciousness and, astonished, say to myself: “THIS is 
supposed to be produced by a process in the brain!” – as it were clutching my forehead. – But 
what can it mean to speak of “turning my attention on to my own consciousness”? There is surely 
nothing more extraordinary than that there should be any such thing! What I described with these 
words (which are not used in this way in ordinary life) was an act of gazing. I gazed fixedly in 
front of me – but not at any particular point or object. My eyes were wide open, brows not 
contracted (as they mostly are when I am interested in a particular object). No such interest 
preceded this gazing. My glance was vacant; or again, like that of someone admiring the 
illumination of the sky and drinking in the light. 
Note that the sentence which I uttered as a paradox (“THIS is produced by a brain 
process!”) has nothing paradoxical about it. I could have said it in the course of an experiment 
whose purpose was to show that an effect of light which I see is produced by stimulation of a 
particular part of the brain. – But I did not utter the sentence in the surroundings in which it 
would have an everyday and unparadoxical sense. And my attention was not such as would have 
been in keeping with that experiment. (If it had been, my gaze would have been intent, not 
vacant) (§412).    
Under criticism is the tendency to take for granted the sense of an expression without first 
considering the sorts of occasions on which – and the associated activities in which – it would 
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make sense to use it – i.e., the various language-games in which an expression is meaningfully 
used. The inclination to consider the sense of an expression apart from its use is associated with a 
particular conception of language according to which the meaning of a word can be given 
independently of that word’s employment on any particular occasion, i.e., that the context and 
circumstances in which a word is used are incidental to its meaning – as if, according to 
Wittgenstein, “the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind 
of use” (§117).46 Against this, Wittgenstein insists that language is meaningful only in light of 
such features, such that determining the sense of an expression must involve a consideration of 
concrete circumstances in which it’s used. For Wittgenstein, then, the task of imagining various 
language-games in which an expression is meaningfully used is to consider the correspondingly 
distinct possible senses for that expression. Thus, as James Conant explains, determining the 
sense of an expression “is a matter of perceiving – of the various possible contributions which 
circumstances of use might make – what sort of contributions the actual circumstances are most 
reasonably taken to make.”47  
The point of such an exercise is not, however, to call to mind, say, the determinate rules 
for the meaningful use of an expression; Wittgenstein was keen to avoid any impression that he 
was interested in systematizing language in such a way (cf. §§130-3). Rather, as Wittgenstein 
clarifies, the exercise is itself occasioned by cases of philosophical confusion in which “language 
 
46 Cf. §120: “People say: it’s not the word that counts, but its meaning thinking of the meaning as a thing 
of the same thing as the word, even though different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. 
The money, and the cow one can buy with it. (On the other hand, however: money, and what can be done 
with it.)” 
47 Conant (2005), p. 61.  
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is, as it were, idling, not when it is doing work” (§132).48 Cavell helpfully characterizes such 
cases as follows: 
[W]e are led to speak ‘outside language games’, consider expressions apart from, and in 
opposition to, the natural forms of life which give those expressions the force they have. […] 
What is left out of an expression if it is used “outside its ordinary language game” is not 
necessarily what the words mean (they may mean what they always did, what a good dictionary 
says they mean), but what we mean in using them when and where we do. The point of saying 
them is lost.49 
Cavell highlights an important dimension of Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphysical conception of 
philosophical problems by emphasizing the internal relation between philosophical confusion 
and the emptiness of what we say – our failure to make sense (cf. §§111, 123, and 125). This 
failure, according to Conant, “is to be traced to a failure on the part of the speaker to project that 
string of words into a new context in a fashion which admits of a stable reading – in a fashion 
which admits of our being able to perceive in the sentence, when we view it against the 
background of its circumstances of use, a coherent physiognomy of meaning.”50 We are, in such 
cases, merely under the illusion of meaning something.   
In §§412-27, Wittgenstein identifies the source of our failure to make sense in a 
misleading picture of consciousness as essentially private, according to which there exists an 
asymmetry between the (type of) access I have to my own consciousness, and the (type of) 
access I have to that of another’s, i.e., that I’m directly, or non-inferentially acquainted with my 
own consciousness, but only indirectly, or inferentially acquainted with that of another’s. Among 
 
48 Cf. §38: “For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.” 
49 Cavell (1979), p. 207; my emphasis.  
50 Conant (2005), p. 61.  
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the difficulties precipitated by this picture, then, is that of accounting for the generality of the 
concept of consciousness, viz. the criteria by which consciousness is ascribed in particular cases. 
For if consciousness is essentially private, what justifies my belief that others are conscious?  
In addressing this difficulty, Wittgenstein, unlike Dennett, doesn’t reject that 
consciousness is private and defend its antithesis – i.e., that consciousness is, essentially, public. 
Rather, Wittgenstein is concerned to show that we simply can’t make sense of the idea that 
consciousness is essentially private by considering a series of cases in which we’re merely under 
the illusion of meaning something definite by it – cases in which, to borrow Cavell’s expression, 
we “mean something other than [we] think.”51  Accordingly, the dialogic exchanges between 
Wittgenstein’s narrator and an interlocutory voice in §§416-20 can be read as unsuccessful 
attempts to make sense of the idea of an asymmetry between first and third-personal statements 
about consciousness. §§416-7 addresses the idea that (i) first-personal uses of the concept of 
consciousness involve direct, non-inferential judgements while §§418-20 address the latter part 
of this idea, namely, that (ii) third-personal uses of the concept of consciousness involve indirect, 
inferential judgements. 
In §416, an interlocutory voice suggests that ascriptions of consciousness are conditioned 
by more explicit forms of agreement among human beings: “Human beings agree in saying that 
they see, hear, feel, and so on (even though some are blind and some are deaf). So they are their 
own witnesses that they have consciousness.” The idea would seem to be that remarks such as, “I 
see…”, “I hear…”, “I feel…” etc., are reports of consciousness. Furthermore, that distinct 
individuals use these expressions would therefore seem to imply the existence of something in 
common between them, with which they’re directly acquainted, i.e., consciousness.  
 
51 Ibid., p. 34; my emphasis.  
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Wittgenstein draws the reader’s suspicion to this claim with the inclusion of the 
parenthetical “(even though some are blind and some are deaf)” (§416), since the line of 
reasoning employed by the interlocutory voice would apparently fail to account for individuals 
lacking such capacities as seeing or hearing. Nevertheless, the full weight of Wittgenstein’s 
criticism is borne through his narrator’s exclamation at the idea’s utter absurdity:  
But how strange this is! Whom do I really inform if I say “I have consciousness”? What is the 
purpose of saying this to myself, and how can another person understand me? – Now, sentences 
like “I see”, “I hear”, “I am conscious” really have their uses. I tell a doctor “Now I can hear with 
this ear again”, or I tell someone who believes I am in a faint “I am conscious again”, and so on 
(§416).  
Wittgenstein’s narrator criticizes the interlocutory voice’s assumption that the remark “I have 
consciousness” takes the form of a report by contrasting it with remarks such as “I see”, “I hear”, 
and “I am conscious” (§416). While we can readily imagine cases in which those latter remarks 
could be used to inform another of something, it’s difficult to imagine cases in which the former 
could be used informatively. The suggestion, then, is that because of its distinct grammar, first-
personal uses of the concept of consciousness can’t be taken to involve matter-of-factual 
judgements in the same sense in which perceptual reports do. Unlike perceptual reports, first-
personal uses of the concept of consciousness are informative in quite particular circumstances, 
such as those in which, to use the example from §416, we tell another person, “I am 
consciousness” after having fainted.  
 In the following remark, Wittgenstein’s narrator responds to the interlocutory voice’s 
suggestion in §416 that human beings are “their own witnesses that they have consciousness”: 
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“Do I observe myself then, and perceive that I am seeing or conscious? And why talk about 
observation at all? Why not simply say “I perceive I am conscious’? – But what are these words 
‘I perceive’ for here – why not say ‘I am conscious’?” (§417).  
In response, an interlocutory voice suggests, “But don’t the words ‘I perceive’ here show that I 
am attending to my consciousness?” (§417). This suggestion, however, won’t do, for as 
Wittgenstein’s narrator subsequently points out, the non-superfluous addition of “I perceive” 
implies that the remark “I perceive I am conscious” will no longer mean “I am conscious”, but 
rather, “that my attention is focused in such-and-such a way” (§417).  
 The difficulty I noted earlier regarding the generality of the concept of consciousness 
comes to the fore in §418:  
418. Is my having consciousness a fact of experience? –  
But doesn’t one say that human beings have consciousness, and that trees or stones do not? – 
What would it be like if it were otherwise? – Would human beings all be unconscious? – No; not 
in the ordinary sense of the word. But I, for instance, would not have consciousness — as I now 
in fact have it.  
Joachim Schulte helpfully identifies two (not altogether separable) strands of thought in the 
interlocutory voice’s question in §418: “[1] is it an empirical (as opposed, say, to a logical) fact 
that [2] I (as opposed to a different sort of creature) have consciousness?”52  Wittgenstein’s 
narrator addresses these questions by asking us to consider what it would be like if things were 
otherwise, i.e., what it would be like if it weren’t the case that human beings (as opposed to trees 
and stones) had consciousness.   
 
52 Schulte (2017), p. 306.  
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The view that emerges from §§418-9 is that ascriptions of consciousness in particular 
cases depend very little on extra-grammatical criteria, in contrast to those cases in which, for 
example, a fictional anthropologist might determine whether a tribe has a chief: 
419. In what circumstances shall I say that a tribe has a chief? And the chief must surely have 
consciousness. Surely he mustn’t be without consciousness! 
The above remark becomes clearer if we consider it alongside a related scenario that 
Wittgenstein discusses in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: 
     We come to an alien tribe whose language we do not understand. Under what circumstances 
shall we say that they have a chief? What will occasion us to say that this man is the chief even if 
he is more poorly clad than others? The one whom the others obey—is he without question the 
chief?  
      What is the difference between inferring wrong and not inferring? […] Consider 
this.53 
We can imagine, therefore, various criteria by which a fictional anthropologist would infer 
whether a tribe has a chief, for instance, by determining whether one member seems to be giving 
the other orders. Of course, it’s possible not only that we might fail to identify which member of 
the tribe is the chief, but that we’re moreover wrong in presuming that the tribe even has a chief. 
This latter possibility effectively illustrates the dis-analogy between determining, on the one 
hand, whether a tribe has a chief, and whether, on the other hand, the chief has consciousness. 
While in the former case, there’s a clear sense in which we might infer wrongly, and therefore a 
clear “difference between inferring wrong and not inferring” in the latter case, there isn’t a 
similarly clear difference between inferring wrong and not inferring, for it isn’t clear what it 
would mean to be wrong in assuming that a given member of the tribe is conscious. 
 
53 Wittgenstein (1983), p. 352; my emphasis. 
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The dis-analogy in §419 can therefore be read as drawing our suspicion to the idea that 
ascriptions of consciousness involve hypothetical judgments, or opinions – that such judgements 
concern empirical facts, or “facts of experience” (§418). Of course, human beings in general can 
be said to “have consciousness,” but this amounts to a rather trivial claim, one that would 
properly be said, as Wittgenstein puts it in a subsequent passage of RFM, to belong to the “form 
of the natural-historical proposition” (p. 353), or the form of those “remarks concerning the 
natural history of human beings; not curiosities, however, but facts that no one has doubted, 
which have escaped notice only because they are always before our eyes” (§415). In other words, 
that human beings “have consciousness” is not an inference we make on the basis of observable 
criteria. Rather, it is a grammatical remark, or a remark about the grammar of the concept of 
‘consciousness.’ Consider, in this connection, the following: “[…] only of a living human being 
and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is 
blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious” (§282). Relatedly, to ask whether a given non-
human animal has consciousness is not to ask whether it possesses something that human beings, 
likewise, possess – whether, in other words, we’re to include it in the fantasy of ourselves.  On 
the contrary, to ask whether it has consciousness is to admit uncertainty about our relation to it. 
This implies not only that we might have an insufficient understanding of it, but that we might 
also have an insufficient understanding of ourselves. 
We can therefore see, on the basis of the remarks that precede §420, that the interlocutory 
voice is, in a sense, forced to the assumption that one could imagine that others were automata. 
The interlocutory voice wants to maintains, despite what Wittgenstein’s narrator suggests in 
§§416-19, that having consciousness, or being conscious, is an empirical fact, or a “fact of 
experience” (§418). Accordingly, the interlocutory voice must admit the possibility that human 
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beings lacked consciousness per the terms of the counterfactual in §418 – i.e., “What would it be 
like if it were otherwise?” (§418). Implicit in the interlocutory voice’s question in §420, then, is 
something like the following line of thought:  
Isn’t it possible that another person, I mean ‘person’, might lack consciousness, without there 
being any outward difference in her, I mean ‘her’, behavior? For what has consciousness to do 
with behavior? Isn’t the former necessarily private and the latter necessarily public? For while 
I’m certain that I am conscious (and you that you are conscious), I can, at best, only surmise that 
another whom I see is conscious (and another the same of me).54 Thus, if it weren’t the case that 
human beings had consciousness, of course they wouldn’t be ‘unconscious’ in the ‘ordinary sense 
of the word’, for they’d be automata! 
Although Wittgenstein’s narrator at first seems to concede that we could, in fact, imagine 
that others are automata, his response should be read in light of the methodological 
considerations which I discussed above. Thus, in §420, Wittgenstein’s narrator begins by 
considering a case in which it would make sense to say that we’re imagining others as automata: 
“If I imagine it now – alone in my room – I see people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going 
about their business – the idea is perhaps a little uncanny” (§420). In challenging the 
interlocutory voice to “try to hang onto this idea in your ordinary intercourse with others” 
(§420), Wittgenstein’s narrator draws attention to the practical differences between the two 
settings – i.e., that the latter setting won’t involve the type of activities proper to the former in 
which one could be said to have imagined that others are automata. Accordingly, Wittgenstein’s 
narrator anticipates the following difficulties for the interlocutory voice: 
 
54 Cf. §246. 
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Say to yourself, for example: “The children over there are mere automata; all their liveliness is 
mere automatism.” And you will either find these words becoming quite empty; or you will 
produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort (§420a).  
The expectation isn’t that the interlocutory voice will find his imaginative powers fail where 
before they were quite successful. Rather, the expectation is that the interlocutory voice realize 
that he wasn’t doing what he thought he was doing in the former, viz., entertaining a 
counterfactual.  
Thus, the moral of §420 isn’t that we can’t imagine that others are automata, but that, in 
taking for granted what it means to imagine that others are automata we create the illusion of a 
substantial difference between creatures with and without consciousness. Moreover, §420 
illustrates that what it means to imagine something is hardly unambiguous, either, a point 
Wittgenstein makes in §397 concerning the extent to which the sense of an expression depends 
on its imaginability:  
397. Instead of “imaginability”, one can also say here: representability in a particular medium of 
representation. And such a representation may indeed safely point a way to a further use of a 
sentence. On the other hand, a picture may obtrude itself upon us and be of no use at all.  
Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that third-personal uses of the concept of 
consciousness involve indirect, inferential judgments shouldn’t be taken to suggest that he 
considered such judgements to be direct, or non-inferential, instead – viz., that behavioral criteria 
provide direct evidence for whether another is consciousness. Rather, Wittgenstein’s criticisms 
are directed, more broadly, against the idea that third-personal uses of the concept of 
consciousness involve any appeal to criteria at all. In the next section, I consider what this 
implies for form of our knowledge in other minds – or, as Wittgenstein puts it in §422: “What do 
I believe in when I believe that man has a soul?” 
 28 
4.  
Jonadas Techio takes §420 to illustrate the inadequacy of behavioral criteria in 
determining whether another has a mind, or soul.55 Accordingly, the possibility of imagining that 
others are automata, and furthermore seeing others as automata, is taken by Techio to suggest 
that our seeing and/or treating others as human beings depends on more than merely the 
satisfaction of behavioral criteria. This point is reflected, according to Techio, in Wittgenstein’s 
notion of an “attitude towards a soul” and in Stanley Cavell’s distinction between knowledge and 
acknowledgment in his treatment of the problem of other minds.56 On these connections, Techio 
writes: 
The emphasis […] on our attitudes or reactions (as opposed to our opinions or beliefs), brings to 
the fore a central aspect of Stanley Cavell’s thinking about the “problem of other minds” – 
namely, that ‘the problem’ is not a matter of (mere) knowledge, but acknowledgement […] These 
formulations are meant to emphasize that we — that is, each of us — have an active role and an 
irreducible (although all-too-easily evadable) responsibility in adopting a certain attitude in the 
face of others. This, I take it, is an important first step toward explaining why, even when all the 
behavioral criteria for the ascription of “humanity” are met, one can still avoid adopting that 
‘attitude towards a soul’ of which Wittgenstein speaks, treating those living beings instead as 
mere automatons.57  
Moreover, Techio shows considerable interest in §420’s concluding analogy, for in his 
view, it “offers an explicit parallel between the experience of seeing aspects in figures and the 
experience of seeing aspects in living beings (i.e., seeing them as automatons / as humans).”58 
 
55 Techio (2013), p. 70.  
56 Ibid., p. 72.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Techio (2013), p. 70.  
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On this parallel, Techio invokes Stephen Mulhall’s reading of Wittgenstein’s distinction between 
the “continuous seeing of an aspect” and the “dawning of an aspect” in PPF §118, which he 
summarizes as follows:  
Continuous aspect perception is a “further species of our ‘regarding-as’ response to pictures — 
one might say it is our default response to them; the experience of aspect-dawning, on the 
contrary, is an exception which proves the rule.59  
Applying this distinction to §420, Techio writes:  
Clearly, we (that is, most of us, most of the time) do not (ordinarily) take that we know as human 
beings for human beings, as it would happen in an experience of aspect-dawning. (Human beings 
are not, in this sense, analogous to ambiguous pictures.) Yet, as PI [§420] illustrates, in very 
special circumstances we can stop (avoid, fail) to see human beings as such, and this would be 
analogous to the (similarly uncanny) experience of making familiar words lose their meanings 
after much repetition. What this (exceptional) possibility of aspect-change shows, therefore, is 
that we continuously see human beings as human, and in this sense one can say (as Wittgenstein 
did) that “[s]eeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a 
limiting case or variant of another.”60 
Techio’s conclusion that we “continuously see human beings as human”61 shouldn’t be taken to 
suggest that he understands there to be a determinate aspect, under which, human beings are 
continuously seen – as in the case of seeing an ambiguous figure under one or another of its 
aspects. His qualification that seeing others as automata is more closely analogous to the sort of 
experience in which "familiar words lose their meaning after much repetition” suggests, instead, 
that he understands the experience to consist in a disruption to the familiar way in which we’re 
 
59 Ibid., p. 75. 
60 Ibid., p. 76.  
61 Ibid.  
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otherwise oriented toward others, our attitudes towards them – not only in terms of how we see 
them, but including, also, the range of our diverse responses to them. Borrowing Cavell’s 
expression, Techio refers to such disruptions as “discrete occurrences of soul-blindness,”62 in 
which, one “avoid[s] adopting that ‘attitude towards a soul’ […] treating those living beings 
instead as mere automatons.”63 The moral that Techio draws from §420, then, is that we must 
ultimately maintain that attitude towards a soul, failing which, the possibility of seeing others as 
automata depends.  
Although I share Techio’s sympathies for Cavell’s treatment of the problem of other 
minds, I want to resist his claim that the inadequacy of behavioral criteria is illustrated by §420 
in the experience of seeing others as automata. Towards this goal, I begin by arguing that 
Techio’s use of the notion of “continuous aspect perception” in the conclusion he draws from 
§420 that we “continuously see human beings as human”64  involves a misreading of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect perception – the locus classicus of which is Chapter xi of 
Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment, formerly known as Part II of the Investigations. I then 
consider Techio’s suggestion that the experience of seeing others as automata constitutes soul-
blindness, or a disruption in one’s attitude towards them, i.e., that one’s attitude towards them no 
longer takes the form of an attitude towards a soul. Against this, I argue that the experience of 
seeing others as automata cannot be taken to imply any definite claims about how one is 
otherwise oriented toward others, or what it means to see others as ensouled. 
The notion of “continuous aspect perception” is, first of all, an artefact of the secondary 
 
62 Ibid., p. 78.  
63 Ibid., p. 72; my emphasis.  
64 Ibid. 
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literature, for nowhere does the expression appear in Wittgenstein’s writings.65 Rather, it's 
derived from what Wittgenstein calls the “continuous seeing” of an aspect in PPF 118, which he 
distinguishes from the “lighting up” of an aspect immediately after introducing his figure of the 
duck-rabbit: 
118. […] And I must distinguish between the ’continuous seeing’ of an aspect and an aspect’s 
‘lighting up’.  
     The picture might have been shown me, without my ever seeing in it anything but a rabbit. 
[…] 
120. I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit from the first. That is to 
say, if asked “What’s that?” or “what do you see there?”, I would have replied: “A picture-
rabbit.” If I had further been asked what that was, I would have explained by pointing to all sorts 
of pictures of rabbits, would perhaps have pointed to real rabbits, talked about their kind of life, 
or given an imitation of them. 
121. I would not have answered the question “what do you see here?” by saying: “now I see it as 
a picture-rabbit.” I would simply have described my perception, just as if I had said “I see a red 
circle over there”. 
     Nevertheless, someone else could have said of me: “He sees the figure as a picture-rabbit.” 
At least two notable features of the “continuous seeing” of an aspect emerge from the above 
remarks. First, as Avner Baz observes66, its grammar mirrors that of the first of the two uses of 
the word “see” that Wittgenstein distinguishes at the beginning of PPF, xi:  
 111. Two uses of the word “see”. 
     The one: What do you see there?” – “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). 
The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” – let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the 
 
65 Baz (2019), p. 46 
66 Baz (2019), p. 49. 
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faces as clearly as I do myself. 
     What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.  
112. The one man might make an accurate drawing of the two faces and the other notice in the 
drawing the likeness which the former did not see. 
113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not 
changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticing an aspect”.   
Cases involving the “continuous seeing” of an aspect therefore take the form of a report – given 
via a description, a drawing, a copy, etc. – and typically in response to a question such as, “What 
do you see?” Second, in cases involving ambiguous figures – e.g. the duck-rabbit, Necker cube, 
etc. – the notion is used only in the third-person, i.e., to say of another person under what aspect 
they see an object (PPF 121).67  
Taken together, these features serve to limit the notion of the “continuous seeing” of an 
aspect to quite specific (types of) cases. On this point, Baz argues:  
[The] 'continuous seeing' of an aspect as here used by Wittgenstein is only applicable to 
ambiguous figures–or anyway to things we know may be seen in several more or less determinate 
ways. It does not apply, for example, to the case of being struck all of a sudden by the similarity 
of one face to another—where one comes to see that other face in the face one is looking at [...] 
Here the dawning aspect has not replaced some other aspect under which that face had been seen 
up until the dawning of the similarity. We were seeing the face all right, but under no particular 
aspect. And if one wanted to insist that we were seeing the face continuously as a face, going 
against Wittgenstein's warnings that it makes no sense to talk of seeing something as what we 
know it to be, it should then be noted that that 'aspect' wasn't eclipsed by the dawning similarity–
as the duck is eclipsed by the rabbit, and vice versa-which means that the other alleged 'aspect' is 
 
67 Ibid., 51. 
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not grammatically, or ontologically, on a par with the dawning aspect.68  
On Baz’s reading, the notion of the “continuous seeing” of an aspect occupies a rather marginal 
role in Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect perception, which he distinguishes merely to avoid 
confusion before ultimately returning his focus to those cases involving the “lighting up” or 
“dawning” of an aspect.69 Baz is therefore critical of those commentators who regard these 
notions as distinct forms of aspect perception, especially those who have gone even farther in 
suggesting that “the experience of aspect-dawning should be understood against the background 
of that continuous perceptual relation to things that may aptly be called ‘continuous aspect 
perception’.”70 Against this, Baz claims that “Wittgensteinian aspects can only dawn,”71 so that 
Wittgenstein’s stated aim in PPF 115 is really that of “elucidating the concept of noticing an 
aspect and its place ‘among the concepts of experience’.”72  
Accordingly, Baz takes Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect perception to be principally 
concerned with those cases of perceptual experience involving the second use of the word “see” 
(PPF 111), in which the aspect that “lights up” or “dawns” cannot be given independently of the 
experience itself. Or, as Baz puts it, “[Wittgensteinian] aspects contrast with what is objectively 
there to be seen, where what is objectively there to be seen may be determined, and known to be 
there, from a third-person perspective, and independently of any(one’s) particular perceptual 
experience of it.”73 This doesn’t imply that Wittgensteinian aspects are private, ineffable 
properties of one’s subjective experience (cf. PPF 132-4). The “categorial difference between 
 
68 Ibid., p. 52.  
69 Ibid., pp. 48-9. 
70 Ibid., p. 44.  
71 Ibid., p. 10.  
72 Ibid., p. 11.  
73 Ibid., p. 11; my emphasis.  
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the two ‘objects’ of sight” that Wittgenstein considers in PPF 111 is not an ontological, but a 
grammatical one.  
To make this last point clear, I want to return to the example Wittgenstein considers in 
PPF 111-2. I noted above that cases involving the first use of the word “see” paradigmatically 
take the form of a report, such that one can inform another person of what one sees in response to 
such a question as, “What do you see there?” Baz adds to this that “unless [the person who asks 
this] is testing our eyesight or linguistic competence, she is asking because she cannot, for some 
more or less contingent reason, see for herself.”74 On the contrary, the point of giving expression 
to the dawning of an aspect is not to inform another person of what one sees (according to the 
second use of the word “see”), where the other isn’t in a position to see it. Rather, as the example 
of PPF 111-2 illustrates, two, similarly-situated individuals might see (according to the first use 
of the word “see”) the same two faces, while one notices in it a likeness which the other fails to 
see (according to the second use of the word “see”). The former might nonetheless give 
expression to her experience by inviting the other to notice the likeness that she had hitherto 
failed to see (according to the second use of the word “see”). Thus, as Baz notes, 
“Wittgensteinian aspects are importantly characterized by the possibility that a fully competent 
speaker (and perceiver) may fail to see (or otherwise perceive) them even though she sees (first 
sense) as well as anyone else the objects in which they are seen, and by the particular sense it 
makes to call upon such a person to see them.”75  
It is in this sense, then, that aspects – unlike the third-personal, objective features of the 
world with which they’re contrasted – are, as Wittgenstein puts it, “subject to the will”:  
256. Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is such an order as “Imagine this!”, 
 
74 Ibid., p. 12. 
75 Ibid., pp. 12-3 
 35 
and also, “Now see the figure like this!”; but not “Now see this leaf green!”.  
Thus, what the grammatical difference between the two uses of the word “see” suggests is that 
the point of seeing aspects is not to inform another of what one sees (according to the first use of 
the word “see”) but rather, Baz argues, “to invite the other to see something in or about the object 
– something that strikes us as there to be seen, even though we normally acknowledge that there 
is no way for us to establish its presence.”76 In other words, to insist on treating aspects as if their 
presence were objectively confirmable is, precisely, to miss the point of seeing aspects. 
Applying the above considerations to Techio’s reading of §420, the following problems 
emerge. First, his conclusion presumes that seeing human beings as automata is tantamount, or 
reducible to a failure to see human beings as human beings. If we grant that seeing other human 
beings as automata is, in some sense, an extraordinary or anomalous experience, it doesn’t 
therefore follow that we ordinarily see other human beings as human beings. For the aspect that 
dawns, or “lights up”, in the case of seeing others as automata doesn’t replace any particular way 
in which we might have otherwise been seeing others. Even assuming there were an “aspect” 
under which we were seeing others up until the moment we began seeing them as automata, that 
“aspect” wouldn’t be, as Baz puts it, “grammatically, or ontologically on a par with the dawning 
aspect.”77 For it cannot be said that we “continuously see human beings as human”78, if “see” is 
used here in the same sense in which we say that we “see living human beings as automata” 
(§420).  
Despite qualifying that he doesn’t take there to be a determinate aspect under which 
human beings are continuously seen as human beings, Techio’s suggestion that the experience of 
 
76 Baz (2011), p. 711. See also: Baz (2000). 
77 Baz, p. 52.  
78 Techio (2013), p. 76. 
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seeing others as automata constitutes an anomalous disruption in our attitudes towards others 
remains problematic. Indeed, this line of thought is in entirely the wrong direction, for we would, 
in effect, produce in ourselves that “uncanny feeling” (§420) about which Wittgenstein’s narrator 
warned. That is, it would lead us anxiously to wonder at our condition vis-a-vis others; e.g. what 
is it about others, my relation to others, me, that accounts for the possibility of seeing them 
otherwise than as I normally (or should?) see them?  (cf. “The transition from obvious nonsense 
to something which is unobvious nonsense” (§524).)  
The mistake, then, is to interpret the uncanniness of the experience of seeing others as 
automata to imply anything about how we ordinarily see others. In §596, Wittgenstein considers 
a similar mistake underlying a particular misconception regarding the relation between the 
feelings of familiarity and unfamiliarity, i.e., the idea that the latter constitutes a disruption of the 
former: 
[T]here are feelings of strangeness: I stop short, look at the object or man questioningly or 
suspiciously, and say “I find it all strange”. – But the existence of this feeling of strangeness does 
not give us a reason for saying that every object which we know well and which does not seem 
strange to us gives us a feeling of familiarity – It is as if we thought that the space once filled by 
the feeling of strangeness must surely be filled by something. The space for these kinds of 
atmosphere is there, and if one of them is not filling it, then another is (§596).  
Thus, although Techio doesn’t take there to be a determinate aspect under which human beings 
are continuously seen, he nonetheless makes the same type of mistake in attempting to account 
for the feeling of uncanniness produced by the experience of seeing others as automata by 
treating the situation as if there were a specifiable something for which that feeling is a 
replacement – viz., an “attitude towards a soul.” Indeed, that Techio takes there to be role along 
these lines for Wittgenstein’s notion of an “attitude towards a soul” suggests a serious 
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misunderstanding.79  
Finally, I want to address this last point by looking briefly at the set of remarks in PPF 
from which Wittgenstein’s notion of an “attitude towards a soul” is taken:  
19. “I believe that he is suffering.” — Do I also believe that he isn’t an automaton? 
     Only reluctantly could I use the word in both contexts.  
     (Or is it like this: I believe that he is suffering, but am certain that he is not an 
automaton? Nonsense!) 
20. Suppose I say of a friend: “He isn’t an automaton.” — What information is conveyed by this, 
and to whom would it be information? To a human being who meets him in ordinary 
circumstances? What information could it give him? (At the very most, that this man always 
behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.) 
21. “I believe that he is not an automaton”, just like that, so far makes no sense. 
22. My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a 
soul.  
As the concluding parenthetical of §20 intimates, the claim “He isn’t an automaton” is 
uninformative because it does not offer any meaningful contrast with what the friend, as a matter 
of fact, is – as if there were something that the friend possessed, something peculiar to human 
beings and peculiarly absent from automata (viz. consciousness, a soul), in virtue of which, 
saying “He isn’t an automaton” could be taken to mean “He is a human being”. Moreover, 
Wittgenstein pursues a similar strategy to that of §§412-27 in suggesting that, grammatically 
speaking, the point of such remarks as “He isn’t an automaton” isn’t to inform others. That isn’t 
 
79 There is an extensive literature on this topic, including the following two pieces from a recently 
published anthology, Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind: Cerbone (2019) and Dain (2019). The 
following is a sample of some of the more well-known contributions to that literature: Cook (1969), 
Cavell (1979) Winch (1980-1), and Ter Hark (1991). 
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to say that such a remark couldn’t be used significantly, but only that it shouldn’t be understood 
as specifying what, as a matter of fact, he (or any human being) isn’t. The upshot of PPF §§19-
22 parallels §§416-20; namely, that third-personal uses of the concept of consciousness (or the 
soul) don’t involve indirect, or inferential judgements about what a human being, as a matter of 
fact, is, for the form of our knowledge of other minds isn’t one of matter-of-factual belief, or 
opinion.   
In describing the form of our knowledge of other minds as an “attitude towards a soul”, 
instead, Wittgenstein shouldn’t be understood as suggesting a technical distinction between an 
attitude and an opinion, according to which the former is, so to speak, an epistemically stronger 
form of the latter. Nor does Wittgenstein use “attitude” in the sense of a disposition or outlook, 
as if it were a particular sort of inclination or way of looking at things. Indeed, that Wittgenstein 
doesn’t intend “attitude” in a cognitive sense is evident from his use of the term in §310 of the 
Investigations: 
310. I tell someone I’m in pain. His attitude to me will then be that of belief, disbelief, suspicion, 
and so on.  
Let’s suppose he says, “It’s not so bad”. – Doesn’t that prove that he believes in something 
behind my utterance of pain? — His attitude is proof of his attitude. Imagine not merely the 
words “I’m in pain”, but also the reply “It’s not so bad”, replaced by instinctive noises and 
gestures.  
In suggesting that doubts regarding another’s expression of pain will correspond to differences in 
one’s attitude towards the other shouldn’t be taken to imply that an “attitude towards a soul” will 
be (at least temporarily) suspended in the face of such doubts. As the subsequent paragraph 
suggests, one’s attitude towards another is characteristically unreflective or instinctual, such that 
the changes are understood to describe differences at the level of “fine shades of behavior” (PPF 
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§210). Ultimately, however, such alterations leave unaffected the condition of one’s attitude 
towards a soul.  
Thus, although the experience of seeing another human being as an automaton might 
affect one’s attitude towards her – leading it doesn’t follow that one’s attitude will no longer be 
an attitude towards a soul. For in such cases, the difference will occur at the level in which 
attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspicion are discriminated. To suppose otherwise, as Techio 
does, would  which the concepts of a human being and an automaton are  the internal  way in 
which the concepts of a human being and  thus overlook the moral of the analogy with which 
§420 concludes: “Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure 
as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example” 
(§420). As the example of seeing a window’s cross-pieces as a swastika suggests, seeing the 
windows cross-pieces as a swastika doesn’t consist in a failure to see the window as such. 
Rather, the possibility for that change of aspect depends on conceiving the window-frame as a 
limiting case of a swastika. Likewise, the possibility of seeing a human being as an automaton 
depends on conceiving human beings as limiting cases of automata – as, for example, Descartes 
did.  
The mistake, according to Wittgenstein, is to assume that a particular mode of 
representation can be justified or rejected in terms of whether it more or less accurately describes 
the facts. Indeed, one of most profound themes of the Investigations is Wittgenstein’s 
recognition of the sources of philosophical problems in those instances in which we’re led to 
believe that “our way of speaking does not describe the facts as they really are” (§402). As Cora 
Diamond explains:  
Wittgenstein describes us as “tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe 
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the facts as they really are.” And this is not because he thinks that it does describe the 
facts as they are, but rather because he takes our mode of speaking not to describe any 
facts at all. More strongly: if we had a different way of speaking, we should not be 
getting something in reality wrong that we are now getting right, nor should we be getting 
something in reality right that we are now getting wrong. There are no metaphysical facts 
to make our way of speaking right or wrong; there is nothing out there to make the 
necessities we have built into language correct or incorrect.80 
This recognition is intimately related to Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as a 
clarificatory activity – his insistence that “philosophy must interfere in any way with the actual 
use of language, so [that] it can in the end only describe it” (§124; my emphasis). That 
philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (§124) doesn’t imply an appeal to common sense, as it 
were, but as Diamond explains, the recognition that “philosophy does not put us in a position to 
justify or criticize what we do by showing that it meets or fails to meet requirements we lay 
down in our philosophizing.”81  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
80 Diamond (1991), p. 15. 
81 Ibid., p. 22.  
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